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Abstract
In the present paper we investigate, 
from the politico-philosophical point of 
view, the inconsistencies of legal solu-
tions concerning reproductive freedom 
that are present in various jurisdictions 
in the civilised world. We hypothesise 
that an attempt to introduce into legal 
systems such institutions as preconcep-
tion harm, prenatal harm or wrongful life 
without taking into consideration meta-
physical questions of identity and onto-
logical status of the foetus is doomed to 
failure. To boot, we pay attention to the 
relationship between these new legal in-
ventions and the question of procreative 
liberty and women’s rights.
1. Introduction
The main purpose of this article is 
to analyse from the politico-philosoph-
ical vantage point the relationship and 
conflict between women’s rights and foe-
tal rights in the context of abortion law 
and the new types of lawsuits such as 
e.g. prenatal harm cases. Despite the 
fact that in many Western legal systems 
women enjoy right to terminate preg-
nancy on demand at the early stage of 
gestational age (g.a.), a remarkable par-
adigm shift in law concerning women’s 
procreative liberty and status of a foetus 
has taken place. This change has oc-
curred outside the abortion framework 
in a form of wrongful life suits, precon-
ception and prenatal harm lawsuits and 
foetal homicide laws. Creating a con-
spicuous discrepancy between status of 
a foetus in the abortion context and its 
standing in other branches of law, those 
legal solutions considerably infringe on 
women’s rights1. We propose the Meta-
physical-Biological Split Account (MBSA) 
as an explanatory framework for the le-
gal and cultural conjuncture mentioned 
above. The MBSA hypothesises that the 
* This paper was presented during the Inter- 
disciplinary-Net Conference at Oxford University, 
September 2013.
1 More about this issue: Kate Wevers, 
Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantaion Genet-
ic Diagnosis In Harvard Journal of Law and 
Technology, 24, 1 (2010); John A. Robertson, Chil-
dren of Choice:Freedom and the New Reproductive 
Technologies, Princeton Academic Press, 1996.; 
Preconception Injuries: Viable Extention of Prena-
tal Injuty or Inconceivable Tort?, Val. U. L. Rev. 12, 
1 (1977), 143-178; Peg Tittle, ‘Permitting Abortion 
and Prohibiting Prenatal Harm: Reconciling the 
Contradiction’. Accessed October 20, 2013. http://
www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Bioe/BioeTitt.htm
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incongruity in question stems from more 
rudimentary failure to discern a crucial 
difference between metaphysical (theory 
of identity) and biological (concept of bio-
logical causality) dimensions of justifi ca-
tion employed in legal and moral debates 
over maternal-foetal confl ict. We content 
that the attempt to set aside metaphysi-
cal considerations while justifying new 
types of legal claims is doomed to failure.
2. Legal Context
In the legal context one deals with the 
so-called prenatal harm lawsuits when 
a pregnant woman or third party infl icts 
by action or negligence harm on a foetus 
who subsequently is born with a disabil-
ity and sues a wrongdoer2. In the United 
States the fi rst case of this type was Gro-
din v. Grodin. The plaintiff sued both his 
mother and her physician for malprac-
tice and negligence during pregnancy. It 
was alleged that the physician had en-
sured the mother that it is impossible 
for her to become pregnant and recom-
mended the treatment with tetracycline. 
As a result of the misdiagnose, a wrong 
decision to proceed with the prescribed 
treatment was made by the mother and 
consequently her child was born with 
discoloured teeth. The main point in this 
case was the category of reasonableness 
as a mother’s duty. In another famous 
case, Bonbrest v. Kotz, the core of jus-
tifi cation was the category of viable foe-
tus. The child who suffered because of 
2 A peculiar version of this type of cases is 
the so-called preconception harm lawsuit where 
a harm is infl icted on a future person preconcep-
tionally by action or omission detrimental to her or 
his health. Since these two types of lawsuits are 
similar from the vantage point of MBSA because 
both of them assume some implicit theory of iden-
tity under the guise of biological causality we shall 
not deal with them separately but will construe 
them just as different versions of the same “genre”.
the physician was authorized to get re-
covery or redress even though injury was 
caused to the foetus. The reason given 
by the court was that foetus cannot be 
treated merely as a part of his mother.
A different type of cases is constitut-
ed by the so-called wrongful life lawsuits. 
Generally speaking, one deals with this 
sort of cases when a woman or third par-
ty acts or omits an action in such a way 
that it makes a future person’s very exist-
ence a harm infl icted on her or him. In 
the United States of America the fi rst law-
suits of this kind was the case Zepeda v. 
Zepeda where the plaintiff was a biologi-
cal son of a man who promised to marry 
the plaintiff’s mother but did not keep his 
word. Similar lawsuits were motivated 
by the claim that harm was done to the 
child who as a result of a given action led 
a life of decreased quality. In most cases 
of this type the plaintiff was the child or 
parents on behalf of the child while the 
defendant was usually the physician who 
by the negligence or malpractice caused 
the injury. Other famous cases include: 
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, Park v. Chesin, 
Becker v. Schwartz. In the fi rst case the 
physician’s malpractice consisted in the 
assurance that mother’s disease (rubella) 
would not have an infl uence on the in-
fant. In Park v. Chesin medical personnel 
was found legally responsible for infl ict-
ing a wrongful life on a child. As we can 
read: “The court, asserting the right of 
a child to be born free of anomalies as 
a fundamental right, therefore ruled that 
the Lara Park’s wrongful life claim was 
valid.”3. In Becker v. Schwartz the court 
ruled that legal institutions are not com-
petent to compare between impaired life 
and non-existence4.
3 Mark Zhang, Park v. Chessin (1977), ‘Em-
bryo Project Encyclopedia’, http://embryo.asu.
edu/handle/10776/2318
4 Wevers, Prenatal Torts, 265.
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3. Conceptual Framework
As aforementioned considerations show 
one can distinguish between different lev-
els of harm that is conceptualised within 
the legal framework described here. First, 
there is a level of normal existence where 
no harm was caused. Second, there is 
a level of a more or less disabled existence 
where harm was infl icted either precon-
ceptionally (preconception harm lawsuits) 
or prenatally (prenatal harm lawsuits) but 
where a disability in question does not 
make the claimant’s life not worth living. 
Third, there is a level of an existence disa-
bled to such an extent that the life with 
this disability is not worth living (wrong-
ful life lawsuits). So, by implication there 
is also the forth level of harm, namely the 
harm of non-existence. Of course killing 
somebody is on this level. As the case of 
wrongful life lawsuits shows there can be 
more severe harm than killing – making 
someone’s life not worth living. 
Following this distinctions, we have 
established the analytical framework for 
our considerations, based on the con-
cept of four relevant levels of existence. 
The fi rst one is described as life which is 
not worth living (NWL) – disability on this 
level is of the highest acuteness. This 
level of existence should be understood 
as “containing more harm” or worse 
than the second level i.e. non-existence 
(NE). We can fi nd a life with a disability 
on a higher level (level of disabled life – 
DL) within our conceptual framework. 
Finally, on the highest level is this kind 
of existence that is commonly called the 
normal life (NL), which we defi ne as a life 
without any disabilities.
Using our analytical framework we 
can say that the concept of prenatal 
harm denotes the act of harming a (fu-
ture) human being after conception but 
before birth to such an extent so as to 
make his life a disabled life (DL) yet 
worth living. The diagram 1. depicts the 




In turn, the concept of preconception 
harm denotes the act of infl icting harm 
on a future human being preconception-
ally that makes his life a disabled life yet 
worth living. The diagram 2. illustrates 
the category of preconception harm.
DIAGRAM 2.
The concept of wrongful life, un-
derstood in a traditional way, does not 
distinguish between harm infl icted pre-
conceptionally and prenatally; what is 
important in wrongful life cases is the 
level of harm which must be so severe to 
make life not worth living. The diagram 3.
illustrates the category of wrongful life. 
Another important point of reference 
for our considerations is the Non-Identity 
Problem (NIP)5. To put the matter sche-
5 Derek Parfi t, Reasons and Persons, Claren-
don Press, Oxford 1987, p. 351-379.
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matically, there are two possibilities of 
infl icting harm on people: 1) our choice 
to infl ict harm affects the same person; 
2) our choice to infl ict harm affects dif-
ferent people. The difference between 
these two choices can be illustrated by 
the following thought experiment. Imag-
ine that there is girl A who is planning 
to have a child but gets to know that 
her child will be moderately disabled if 
she gets pregnant this month. Notwith-
standing this information she decides to 
conceive a child immediately and as pre-
dicted the child is born moderately disa-
bled. Now imagine another scenario. Girl 
B is pregnant (let’s say it is 30th week 
of gestational age) and gets to know that 
her child is going to be moderately disa-
bled. Fortunately, there is a pill that if 
she takes, her child will be cured. She 
decides yet not to take the pill and gives 
birth to a disabled child. In the fi rst sce-
nario the choice made by girl A does not 
affect her actual future child. If she had 
waited a month with conception, her ac-
tual child would not have been born at 
all. There would have been a different 
child, conceived from a different sperm 
and egg. This is a typical example of Dif-
ferent People Choice (DPC). In the sec-
ond scenario, on the other hand, girl B’s 
decision affects her actual future child. 
If she had taken the pill, her child would 
not have been disabled. There would not 
have been a different child but the same 
child without disability. This is a typical 
example of Same People Choice (SPC).
As we now see, for prenatal harm to 
occur it is not enough that harm is in-
fl icted prenatally and is not so severe to 
make life not worth living. There is one 
more condition and a crucial one. A harm 
infl icted on a foetus cannot represents 
an instance of DPC. In other words, it 
must be possible for a given person that 
he or she would have existed if this very 
harm had not been infl icted6.
3. Women’s Rights, Procreative 
Liberty, and Theory of Identity
With the use of our analytical frame-
work, we can identify several recurrent 
discrepancies in the judicial approach to 
prenatal harm and abortion. In America, 
for instance, it is legal to terminate preg-
nancy before the 24th week of g.a. At the 
same time prenatal harm infl icted before 
the 24th week of pregnancy is recognised 
as breach of law and may become a ba-
sis for complaint. Thus it can be inferred 
that the comparison between a child that 
could have been born if the foetus had 
not been aborted and a child that was 
born with a defect as a result of prena-
tal harm seems groundless. This means 
that authorising abortion before the 24th 
week of pregnancy is equal with the as-
sertion that only after this period we see 
foetus as a person with unique identity 
founded, for example, on brain devel-
opment criterion. Nevertheless, in spite 
6 It cannot be the case that the line of this 
person’s existence with disability (DL) can be com-
pared with the line of non-existence (NE) because 
then disability would not be a harm. Disability can 
be considered a harm only when it is compared 
with the line of a normal life (NL); or more general-
ly, disability can be considered a harm only when it 
is compared with a line of existence which is higher 
on the worth of life axis. 
 DIAGRAM 3.
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of the above conclusion, doing harm to 
a foetus on the earlier stage of pregnancy 
is treated as equivalent to doing harm to 
a person. As Bonnie Steinbock writes:
“one court maintained that it is ‘incon-
gruous’ to allow a woman the constitu-
tional right to abort and yet hold a third 
party liable to the foetus for merely negli-
gent acts. Another held that there would 
be an inherent confl ict in giving the mo-
ther the right to terminate the pregnancy 
yet holding that an action may be bro-
ught on behalf of the same foetus under 
the wrongful death act”7,
let alone under the prenatal harm law-
suit.
There are different strategies of deal-
ing with this inconsistency between 
the status of the foetus in the abortion 
context and its position in the tort law. 
Mainly, they refer to the concept of bi-
ological causality which, according to 
these strategies, explains that it is not 
a foetus who is harmed in this sort of 
cases but a future person whom foetus 
gives rise to.
The logic behind the Biological Cau-
sality Account (BCA) looks as follows: 
foetus at e.g. 15th week of g.a. is not 
a person and cannot be harmed. Hence, 
an abortion harms nobody. But if the 
same foetus is later born and becomes 
a person it is this very person who is 
harmed by the action taken prenatally.
In other words, an action performed 
on a foetus in 15th week of g.a. is a cause 
of a disability existing in a person who 
developed from this foetus some time 
later. Scientifi cally confi rmed, biologi-
cal causality that holds between a foetus 
and future person is a basis for the claim 
7 Bonnie Steinbock, Life Before Birth, Oxford 
University Press, 1996, 122.
that this prenatal action is an actual 
cause of a future disability.
Our main thesis in this parer is an 
assertion that BCA is tenuous and suf-
fers from serious metaphysical fl aw. To 
see how it happens consider the follow-
ing line of argument. There are two pos-
sible metaphysical identity relations that 
can hold between the foetus at e.g. 15th 
week g.a. and a future person at e.g. 30th 
week of g.a. They can be the same per-
son or different entities. The fi rst option 
is quite awkward for the proponents of 
prenatal harm lawsuits since it assumes 
that a foetus is the same kind of being 
that you and me. This assumption leads 
in turn to a plain inconsistency with 
the abortion law which does not regard 
a foetus as a person. Moreover, this is 
exactly for the reason of abandoning the 
claim that a foetus is a person that BCA 
has been introduced in the fi rst place. In 
other words, it cannot be personhood of 
a foetus that justifi es prenatal harm law-
suits because it would mean undermin-
ing women’s rights to abortion.
There is then the second option and 
a more interesting one, namely that there 
is no relation of identity between a foetus 
and a harmed person. But if there is not 
an identity relation between a foetus at 
15th week of g.a. and a person at 30th 
week of g.a. then a choice to infl ict some 
kind of harm on the foetus cannot rep-
resent SPC. It represents DPC. In other 
words, it is not like harming somebody 
who could have been existed without be-
ing harmed (there is nobody at 15th week 
of g.a.) but rather like deciding between 
two different people we want to have in 
the future: disabled one or one without 
disability. But then it is not possible to 
harm neither a foetus nor a future per-
son that will develop from this foetus 
since the point of reference for compari-
son here is the non-existence, not an ex-
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istence without disability. For this very 
disabled person there has been no other 
option then being disabled. Unless dis-
ability this person would not have exist-
ed at all; and the non-existence is worse 
than life with disability providing it is not 
an acute disability which makes life not 
worth living.
This line of argument can be criti-
cised in the following manner. This is 
true that a foetus at 15th week of g.a. 
and a person at 30th week of g.a. are not 
identical with each other but it does not 
make the choice to infl ict harm on the foe-
tus a DPC. For a choice to be an instance 
of DPC it is necessary that the difference 
between a factual person and counter-
factual person that would have existed 
if the harmful action had not been per-
formed is so considerable that justifi es 
thinking about these persons as about 
different people. In other words, what is 
crucial in deciding if we are dealing with 
DPC or SPC in a given case is not a ques-
tion about what kind of relation holds 
between two people (entities) temporarily 
(i.e. at two different points in time, e.g. 
between foetus and infant) but factually/
counterfactually. For example, for Derek 
Parfi t the difference between factual and 
counterfactual person is deemed consid-
erable when enough amount of genetic 
material is altered. For other theories of 
identity a difference is deemed consider-
able when other circumstances hold.
Unfortunately, this criticism does 
not work. The answer to the question 
what kind of difference is so consider-
able as to make thinking about factual 
and counterfactual persons as about 
different people depends on the theory 
of identity we actually espouse. The an-
swer to the question what sort of differ-
ence between two persons, factual and 
counterfactual, justifi es treating these 
persons either as different or as identical 
depends on what we believe to be cru-
cial for identity. It can be genes; it can 
be the same embodied mind, it can be 
psychological continuity etc. But what 
our answer to the question always boils 
down to is some explicit or implicit the-
ory of identity. Hence, any justifi cation 
for prenatal harm lawsuits, even this 
which abstracts from metaphysical con-
siderations concerning personal identity 
and employs some kind BCA presuppos-
es some theory of identity. This in turn 
means that it is impossible to justify 
right to abortion and prenatal harm law-
suits at once without delving into meta-
physical questions of identity and onto-
logical status of the foetus which tend to 
bestow a moral status on a foetus and 




Any justifi cations in prenatal harm law-
suits presuppose a variety of identity 
theories regulated by such conceptual 
categories as, for instance, genetics, psy-
chology and embodiment. Regardless of 
their content, such theories are a nec-
essary prerequisite for legal argumenta-
tion in cases dealing with wrongful birth, 
wrongful life and prenatal harm. This 
means that we only have a limited choice 
between explicit rationally justifi ed ac-
counts of identity or implicit and often 
inconsistent or irrational metaphysics.
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Our conclusions are of primary im-
portance for legal defi nitions of repro-
ductive rights in general, not only lim-
ited to women’s right to abortion. It is 
predicted that future developments in 
reprogenetic techniques may cause new 
problems arising from reproductive free-
dom, including such issues as limiting 
the autonomy of parents or modifying 
their progeny’s genetic make-up. If the 
perspective of biological causality is ac-
cepted as valid, then some practices 
should be forbidden even before the con-
ception. Parental autonomy may also be 
reduced as a result of a particular social 
consensus model. A recent example of 
recontextualizing reproductive freedom 
with regard to the type of offspring con-
ceived is the case of achondroplasia8. Af-
ter discovering the gene responsible for 
this illness, apart from parents ready to 
abort zygotes with the gene, there were 
parents who wanted to eliminate zygotes 
without the gene. Metaphysics and theo-
ry of identity should address such issues 
explicitly; otherwise we will end up with 
inconsistent and harmful solutions that 
violate people’s liberty.
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Appendix
Abbreviations:
A – Factual line of life
A0 – Counterfactual line of life
B – Abortion
BC – Biological causality
NL – Normal life
DL – Disabled life
NE – Non-existence
NWL – Life which is not worth living
